
If you are tracking how IBM’s shock could transmit to enterprise software stocks, the most important conclusion is this: based on the net negative exposure to “software budgets being squeezed by AI infrastructure spending,” the risk ranking is NOW > CRM > ADBE > ORCL. ServiceNow is the most dependent on large enterprise workflow projects. Salesforce has a more diversified business mix. Adobe has a buffer from creative and individual users. Oracle’s OCI may absorb part of the server and AI compute budget. This ranking is not the same as the overall investment risk ranking of the four stocks.

The key signal from IBM is not that enterprises have stopped investing in digital transformation. It is that customers are raising the priority of servers, storage, memory, and cybersecurity within a limited budget. Software projects may not be permanently canceled, but signing timelines, expansion plans, and additional licenses may be delayed. For software companies, the real issue is whether large contracts fail to close on schedule, not whether existing subscription revenue disappears immediately.
In its preliminary second-quarter data, IBM expected revenue of $17.2 billion, up 1% year over year. Software revenue grew 5%, consulting revenue was roughly flat, and infrastructure revenue declined 7%. Management said that in the final weeks of June, customers shifted quarterly capital spending toward supply-constrained servers, storage, and memory to avoid possible future price increases. Several large transactions did not close within the expected timeframe, creating the main shortfall.
This means enterprise IT spending is changing in three ways:
The impact on net new orders usually appears earlier than the impact on revenue. Subscription software revenue is recognized over the life of a contract, so a slowdown in new orders in one quarter may not immediately show up in the income statement. ServiceNow has also stated in its risk disclosures that fewer new subscriptions or renewals may have limited impact on current-period revenue but could affect future operating results.
IBM’s shock also includes company-specific factors. Compared with the 11% growth in IBM’s first-quarter software revenue and 15% growth in infrastructure revenue, second-quarter infrastructure and related transaction processing software clearly weakened. This involved mainframe product-cycle changes, customer industry concentration, and sales execution that did not adjust quickly enough.
| IBM Issue | Transmission to Software Stocks | Companies Most Affected |
|---|---|---|
| Delayed large software contracts | High | NOW, CRM |
| AI hardware crowding out software budgets | Medium-high | NOW, CRM, ADBE |
| Weak mainframe product cycle | Low | Mainly IBM |
| Higher cybersecurity priority | Mixed | Some NOW products may benefit |
| Rising infrastructure investment | Mixed | ORCL’s OCI may benefit |
Therefore, IBM’s share-price decline does not directly prove that all enterprise software demand is deteriorating. A more reliable test is whether other companies also report slower cRPO growth, weaker net new ACV, renewal downgrades, and delayed large contracts.
Summary: IBM exposed a shift in enterprise technology budget priorities, not a complete disappearance of software demand. Servers, storage, memory, and cybersecurity spending may be pulled forward, which can first compress new software projects, seat expansion, and cross-department platform rollouts. Because IBM was also affected by its mainframe cycle and sales execution, you should not extrapolate its revenue shortfall proportionally to NOW, CRM, ADBE, and ORCL. The better approach is to compare the four companies’ dependence on new large deals and their ability to benefit from infrastructure spending.

If you only measure the risk that IBM revealed — enterprises reallocating software budgets toward AI infrastructure — ServiceNow ranks first, Salesforce second, Adobe third, and Oracle fourth. This comparison focuses on the net negative impact of budget reallocation on future orders. It is not a judgment on overall financial risk, valuation level, or downside in the share price. If the ranking were based on capital expenditure and financing risk, Oracle would move much higher.
You can build a unified comparison framework using six indicators:
| Company | Enterprise Budget Directness | Large-Deal Sensitivity | Infrastructure Offset | Net Squeeze Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ServiceNow | Very high | Very high | Low | No. 1 |
| Salesforce | High | High | Low | No. 2 |
| Adobe | Medium | Medium | Very low | No. 3 |
| Oracle | Very high | High | Very high | No. 4 |
NOW has strong product stickiness, but new workflows, AI, security, and HR modules often require cross-department approvals. CRM also depends on enterprise subscriptions, but it spans sales, service, marketing, data, and collaboration budgets. ADBE’s enterprise experience business is budget-sensitive, but Creative Cloud, Acrobat, individual users, and small-business customers reduce dependence on a single CIO budget. ORCL’s database and application software may be squeezed, while OCI could become a destination for reallocated budgets.
If you are continuously tracking NOW, CRM, ADBE, and ORCL and adjusting positions through multiple smaller orders, trading costs also affect risk control. U.S. stock trading costs usually include more than commissions; they may also include platform fees, external institution fees, and trading activity fees.
Biya’s U.S. stock trading fee structure shows that U.S. stock trading commission is $0, with a platform fee of $0.005 per share, a minimum of $0.99 per order, and a cap of 1% of trade value. External institution fees and trading activity fees are $0.00396 per share. For fractional-share orders below one full share, the platform fee is 1% of the transaction amount, capped at $1. When splitting trades into multiple small orders, the minimum per-order fee is especially important. Actual fees should be based on the fee center and the order screen.
Summary: Under a unified framework, NOW has the highest net negative exposure to enterprise budget reallocation because its growth depends more on large platform projects and new contracts. CRM ranks second, but its multi-department budget sources and large installed base offer some buffer. ADBE’s enterprise marketing software may be pressured, yet individual and creative users reduce concentration risk. ORCL owns both enterprise software and cloud infrastructure, allowing it to absorb part of the budget shift, but this comes with higher capital expenditure and financing risk.

NOW and CRM are both enterprise subscription software companies, but NOW’s sales are more concentrated in large platform-level projects, CIO budgets, and complex procurement processes. Delays in individual large contracts can more easily affect quarterly order metrics. CRM’s seat-based model faces pressure from layoffs and AI automation, but its products are spread across sales, service, marketing, data, and collaboration teams, making its customer budget sources more diversified and its overall risk slightly lower.
According to ServiceNow’s first-quarter financial results, subscription revenue was $3.671 billion, up 22% year over year. cRPO expected to be recognized over the next 12 months reached $12.64 billion, up 22.5%. The company signed 16 net new ACV deals above $5 million in the quarter, and it had 630 customers with annual contract value above $5 million.
These numbers show that demand remains strong, but they also show NOW’s dependence on large-customer expansion. After customers deploy core IT service management, they often add AIOps, security operations, customer service, HR workflows, and Now Assist. Renewals may remain stable, but when budgets tighten, management teams are more likely to delay new modules and cross-department expansion.
NOW’s buffers include:
Salesforce’s first-quarter financial results showed subscription and support revenue of $10.6 billion, accounting for about 95% of total revenue. cRPO was $33.6 billion, up 14%. Agentforce and Data 360 ARR approached $3.4 billion, with Agentforce ARR at $1.2 billion and more than 50% of related orders coming from existing customers.
CRM’s main risk is the per-user pricing model. Corporate layoffs, seat audits, and AI agents taking over part of sales and service workflows could all reduce the number of traditional accounts. However, Salesforce is trying to expand its charging base from “number of employees” to “AI work completed” through Agentic Work Units, Flex Credits, and premium editions.
| Comparison Dimension | ServiceNow | Salesforce |
|---|---|---|
| Main budget owner | CIO, IT, security, operations | Sales, service, marketing, IT, data |
| Large platform project dependence | Very high | High but more diversified |
| Seat-based model risk | Medium | Higher |
| Core system stickiness | Very high | Very high |
| Key metrics to watch | cRPO, net new ACV, large deals | cRPO, seats, Agentforce usage |
Salesforce expects full-year capital expenditure to be about 1.5% of revenue, so it does not need to carry the heavy data-center buildout burden faced by infrastructure companies. Its risk is mainly organic subscription growth and AI monetization, not capital intensity.
Summary: NOW ranks ahead of CRM not because its existing customers are more likely to churn, but because its growth depends more on large enterprise new projects, cross-department expansion, and long procurement cycles. CRM is also affected by seat optimization and budget tightening, but sales, service, marketing, and data teams provide multiple purchasing entry points. To determine whether risk is truly rising, watch NOW’s net new ACV and large-deal count, and CRM’s organic cRPO, seat trends, and paid Agentforce usage.
Adobe’s net budget squeeze risk is higher than Oracle’s, but the main issues facing the two companies are completely different. Adobe lacks a large infrastructure business as an internal hedge, and enterprise marketing projects can be deferred. Oracle’s traditional software may also be pressured, but OCI directly benefits from AI compute investment. Oracle’s lower ranking only means its “net software budget squeeze risk” is lower; it does not mean its overall risk is smaller.
Adobe’s second-quarter financial results showed revenue of $6.62 billion, up 13% year over year. Total ARR was $27.1 billion, including about $480 million from Semrush. Customer subscription revenue was $6.39 billion, with creative and marketing professionals subscription revenue of $4.54 billion and business professionals and consumers subscription revenue of $1.85 billion.
Adobe’s Digital Experience, enterprise marketing automation, customer data, and experience orchestration businesses are exposed to large enterprise budgets. Compared with databases or ERP, some marketing optimization projects are easier to delay. However, Creative Cloud, Acrobat, individual creators, and small-business customers are not fully dependent on central IT budgets, so the impact does not cover all subscription revenue.
Adobe’s deeper risk comes from AI-native tool competition. The company disclosed that AI-first ARR has exceeded $500 million and has tripled year over year, but it still needs to prove that Firefly, Acrobat AI, and enterprise content supply chain products can generate sustained incremental revenue rather than merely increase product usage.
Oracle’s fourth-quarter and full-year results showed quarterly revenue of $19.2 billion. OCI revenue reached $5.8 billion, up 93% year over year. Cloud application revenue was $4.1 billion, up 10%, while traditional software revenue declined 2% to $6.8 billion.
This data shows Oracle’s dual nature:
But this hedge is not cost-free. Oracle reported full-year operating cash flow of $32 billion and negative free cash flow of $23.7 billion. RPO reached $638 billion, up 363% year over year, with much of the growth coming from large-scale AI contracts. The company also disclosed that customer prepayments or customer-provided GPU-related amounts totaled $75 billion, which can reduce some financing needs. Still, RPO cannot be treated as near-term revenue, profit, or cash flow.
| Risk Type | Adobe | Oracle |
|---|---|---|
| Software budget squeeze | Medium | Medium |
| AI infrastructure benefit | Very low | Very high |
| AI product substitution risk | Very high | Medium |
| Capital expenditure pressure | Low | Very high |
| Free cash flow pressure | Low | Very high |
Summary: Adobe’s main risks are delayed enterprise marketing projects, AI-native tool substitution, and paid conversion for new AI products. Oracle, by contrast, may lose some traditional software growth while gaining OCI and AI data-center orders. That is why ORCL ranks below ADBE in the software budget squeeze ranking. However, Oracle’s negative free cash flow, capital expenditure, financing needs, and large AI contract execution risk should not be ignored. Comparing the two companies with a traditional subscription-revenue framework alone would miss the key differences.
To judge whether IBM’s shock is spreading, you should not only watch whether software stocks keep falling over the next few days. A more reliable standard is whether NOW, CRM, and ADBE show synchronized weakness in large contracts, cRPO, net new orders, or renewal expansion for two consecutive quarters, and whether ORCL can improve cash flow while infrastructure revenue grows. A one-quarter deal delay can often be repaired. A business-model shift lasts much longer.
You can use Biya’s U.S. stock information tool to track relevant U.S. stock symbols in one place, then separately record earnings dates, management guidance, and key metrics. This is more useful than adjusting your view based only on one-day price moves, because it helps identify whether risk comes from industry-wide budget shifts or company-specific execution issues.
| Budget Scenario | NOW and CRM | ADBE | ORCL |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delay of 1–2 quarters | Large deals postponed, existing revenue stable | Enterprise projects slow temporarily | OCI provides partial offset |
| Squeeze lasting 2–4 quarters | cRPO and upsells may slow | Enterprise marketing business pressured | Software slows, OCI expands |
| Pricing model changes | Seats shift toward usage or outcomes | AI reshapes creative tool pricing | Focus shifts to investment returns and cash flow |
In the first scenario, orders simply move across quarters, while renewal rates and customer counts do not deteriorate significantly. The second scenario means enterprises keep raising the priority of AI infrastructure, so software companies must rely on core system stickiness and AI add-on products to sustain growth. The third scenario has the deepest impact: enterprises not only delay software purchases but also reduce traditional seats and demand pricing based on usage, tasks, or business outcomes.
Summary: Confirming industry risk requires continuous observation across multiple metrics, not treating share-price declines as proof. If large contracts are signed later, renewal rates remain stable, and cRPO only fluctuates temporarily, IBM’s shock is more likely a budget timing issue. If net new ACV, seat expansion, organic ARR, and enterprise orders weaken for multiple quarters, budget migration may be turning into an industry trend. ORCL must also prove that high OCI growth can eventually cover capital investment and translate into sustainable cash returns.
When you need to track NOW, CRM, ADBE, and ORCL at the same time, you can use Biya to view U.S. stock market data and build your own earnings watchlist. A more reasonable approach is not to trade purely based on the risk ranking, but to separately monitor cRPO, net new ACV, AI ARR, OCI growth, capital expenditure, and free cash flow, then update your view after each earnings report. Biya supports multi-asset trading across U.S. stocks, Hong Kong stocks, and digital assets. Service availability depends on the user’s location, identity verification result, platform rules, and applicable laws and regulations. Before placing any order through the Biya App, you should review order types, fee details, portfolio concentration, and your own risk tolerance. The analysis above only introduces publicly available market information, business structures, and fee arrangements. It does not constitute investment advice.
No. IBM’s performance was affected by its mainframe product cycle, transaction processing software, large-customer mix, and sales execution. Only if NOW, CRM, ADBE, and other companies also show sustained weakness in orders, renewals, and cRPO would the case for an industry-wide software demand slowdown become stronger.
Usually not. Subscription revenue is recognized over the contract period, so budget tightening first affects new projects, seat expansion, cross-department rollouts, and upcoming renewals. Revenue impact often lags changes in net new orders and remaining performance obligations.
No. cRPO represents contracted revenue expected to be recognized over the next 12 months, but it can be affected by currency, acquisitions, renewal timing, and contract duration. To assess order quality, you also need to look at net new ACV, organic growth, large-deal count, billings, and customer expansion.
AI may reduce some software seats tied to manual workflows, but it may also create new revenue from agent usage, workflow execution, and consumption-based products. The key question is whether AI add-on revenue can offset traditional user-account reductions and customer price pressure.
No. RPO represents contracted revenue not yet recognized. It still depends on contract execution, data-center delivery, customer credit, service costs, and revenue recognition timing. High RPO improves revenue visibility, but it does not directly represent margins or free cash flow.
Investors should watch whether delayed projects are signed in later quarters, while also checking renewal rates, customer count, net revenue retention, and contract value. A single-quarter drop in large deals is not enough to prove customer loss. Repeated changes across two or more earnings cycles are more meaningful.
*This article is provided for general information purposes and does not constitute legal, tax or other professional advice from BiyaPay or its subsidiaries and its affiliates, and it is not intended as a substitute for obtaining advice from a financial advisor or any other professional.
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